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Abstract: Reciprocity is a vital feature of social networks, but relatively little is known
about its temporal structure or the mechanisms underlying its persistence in real world
behavior. In pursuit of these two questions, we study the stationary and dynamical signals
of reciprocity in a network of manioc beer (Spanish: chicha; Tsimane’: shocdye’) drinking
events in a Tsimane’ village in lowland Bolivia. At the stationary level, our analysis reveals
that social exchange within the community is heterogeneously patterned according to kinship
and spatial proximity. A positive relationship between the frequencies at which two families
host each other, controlling for kinship and proximity, provides evidence for stationary
reciprocity. Our analysis of the dynamical structure of this network presents a novel method
for the study of conditional, or non-stationary, reciprocity effects. We find evidence that
short-timescale reciprocity (within three days) is present among non- and distant-kin pairs;
conversely, we find that levels of cooperation among close kin can be accounted for on the
stationary hypothesis alone.
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Se hacı́a chicha, después se juntaba la gente y después todita la gente estaba borracha y cantaban las
canciones de los animales: del chancho de tropa, del marimono, del maneche, y seguı́an cantando...
Chicha was made, and the people got together, and then everyone was drunk and singing the songs
of the animals—the white-lipped peccary, the spider monkey, the howler monkey—and on they sang...
–Felipe Huallata [1]

1. Introduction
The evolutionary social and life sciences seek to understand both the ultimate evolutionary logic
that motivates the formation of valuable social relationships, as well as the proximate mechanisms that
support the stability of these relationships over time [2–4]. Longitudinal social network data provide an
arena for evaluating the predictions of evolutionary models for relationship formation and maintenance
through time. These data also inform us of the time dimension of network activity, a topic of both
empirical and theoretical interest in the network sciences [5,6]. More generally, these data can shed light
on the time scale of the processes that are in motion within social and biological systems [7–9].
Among the indigenous farming populations of the Amazon, social gatherings centered around
drinking home-brewed manioc beer (Spanish: chicha; Tsimane’: shocdye’) provide a context for the
development and exercise of valuable cooperative relationships [10]. In addition to the food value of
the beer, conviviality and intoxication create a social venue for conversation, exchange and friendship.
Investment in these social bonds may yield benefits in other domains of social life, such as cooperative
labor, food sharing, politics, mobility and mate search.
Here, we analyze time-series data on hosting and attending manioc beer events collected across a
sixteen-week period in a Tsimane’ village in Bolivian Amazonia. We use multi-level modeling methods
to analyze the stationary patterns of social events across the sample period. We evaluate the extent to
which these patterns are consistent with predictions from the evolutionary theories of kin selection—that
individuals behave more altruistically toward closer kin [11]—and reciprocity—that favors given are
repaid by favors received in return [12]. For our analysis of the nature of the underlying dynamical
processes that create and sustain these stationary patterns, we formulate an account of reciprocity in
terms of conditional probabilities and test for statistical significance using a hierarchy of null models.
These models evaluate the extent to which family i hosting family j is predictive of j hosting i in return
within a specified period of time.
1.1. Evolutionary Background and Motivation
Evolutionary theory suggests a number of pathways by which selection can be expected to favor the
emergence and stability of altruistic and cooperative social relationships [13,14]. Hamilton’s theory
of kin selection [11] (which predicts that altruism is favored when the cost to donors is less than the
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benefit to recipients devalued by the coefficient of relatedness, r) provides a fundamental anchor-point
for understanding the stability of many observed cases of altruism in the natural world [15–17].
Anthropologists have similarly recognized the central organizing role of kinship in structuring patterns
of social interaction in human societies [18]; and a growing number of quantitative studies have
demonstrated the explanatory power of relatedness in traditional field settings [13,19–21].
The theory of dyadic reciprocity, articulated in sociology by Mauss [22] and developed in evolutionary
terms by Trivers [12] and Axelrod and Hamilton [23], provides an additional pathway to cooperation,
which may operate independently of or in interaction with genetic kinship. The stability of cooperation
through reciprocity is established by virtue of the fact that favors given are repaid by favors received in
return. In the context of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the tit-for-tat strategy provides a simple and
direct instantiation of the principle of reciprocal support [23].
Empirical studies in humans and other primates have generally evaluated the consistency of observed
patterns of interaction with the theory of reciprocity by measuring the degree to which help given
is correlated with help received across pairs of individuals or families within a community (often
controlling for other factors, such as kinship); this metric is typically termed “contingency” in the
anthropological literature [24] or “reciprocity” in the social network literature [25–27]. Field studies
of human and non-human primates have tended to yield positive estimates of contingency in networks
of directed sharing, grooming and support [28,29]; high levels of reciprocity are also a common
feature of networks analyzed in the social network literature [26,30]. In either case, levels of
contingency/reciprocity have shown considerable variation depending on local circumstance and the
type of interaction examined [24,26–30].
The time scales over which reciprocity may operate in natural settings remain an open area of research.
On the one hand, if a simple tit-for-tat-like rule takes into account only one or a few recent interactions,
feedback between an individual’s actions and their partners’ responses should be observable within a
relatively short span of time (sufficient to capture multiple opportunities for interaction). On the other
hand, decisions to lend or withhold support may take into account a pair’s history of interaction over
relatively longer spans of time, making their conditionality hard to detect within the space of a single
observational study. Alternatively and complementarily, long-term dynamics of partner choice and
selective retention may establish the conditions for reciprocity without short-term accounting of goods
and services exchanged [29,31,32].
The time scales of reciprocity have proven difficult to characterize empirically. Given constraints
on data collection in ethnographic settings, most tests of contingency in humans compare interaction
rates summarized at a single point in time [33] or rates that are averaged or summed over the period of
sampling [13,34]. In one approach, Gurven’s analysis of Ache food sharing showed that rates of giving
to a particular family in one period correlated positively with rates of receiving from that family in the
subsequent period [24]. While studies of captive primates have produced some evidence for short-term
contingent reciprocity [35–38], results have tended to be weak, leading researchers to suggest that the
mechanisms supporting cooperative dyadic relationships may tend to operate over durations of time that
exceed the span of most longitudinal studies [29,38–43].
Additionally, there is an open debate about the expected relationship between kinship and reciprocity
in naturalistic settings. On the one hand, Axelrod and Hamilton [23] and subsequent theoretical
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models [44–46] have predicted a positive synergy between kinship and reciprocity. Relatedness may
facilitate the establishment of reciprocal exchange by increasing the effective benefits of initial altruistic
acts, or increasing the probability that cooperative strategies find each other [23,44,47]. Compared to
non-kin, kin may often face lower transaction costs in forming reciprocal relationships, due to greater
proximity, familiarity or the likelihood of repeated interaction [47].
If, on the other hand, kinship and reciprocity act as strategic substitutes, cooperation may be
maintained by mainly altruistic motives among kin, but reciprocity among non-kin. When statistically
modeling cooperative relationships in field settings, a negative interaction between kinship and
contingency may also capture inequality/asymmetries within reciprocal relationships driven by the
directionality of kin-based altruism (e.g., due to age or differential productivity). Empirical results on
this topic ([20,33,47,48], current study) have been mixed, which may reflect true cross-case variation in
the degree to which kinship and reciprocity are complementary or substitutable means for stabilizing
social bonds.
While generosity motivated by kinship or dyadic reciprocity implies that interactions should be
patterned according to dyadic characteristics (i.e., degree of relatedness, rates of favors returned), other
evolutionary processes may support patterns of behavior that are not so clearly resolved at the dyadic
level. In systems of indirect reciprocity, competitive altruism or generosity signaling [49–51], individuals
extend help to others with the expectation of the return of benefits, not from the recipient per se,
but from other members of the community who become aware of the act and adjust their behavior
toward the donor accordingly (see, also, Trivers’ discussion of generalized altruism in [12]). Accounts
of “strong reciprocity” and cultural group selection have suggested that unconditional altruism and
behaviors reinforcing prosociality (such as peer monitoring and punishment) may be favored by group
or multi-level selection [52,53].
In such situations where giving is diffuse and generalized, one would not expect strong correlations
between the rates of giving and receiving within dyads, nor systematic heterogeneity in the quality of
dyadic relationships (except that which is produced as a function of spatial proximity or other exogenous
factors affecting rates of association). Similarly, prosocial behavior motivated by the benefits of signaling
one’s wealth, condition or quality [54,55] generally predicts stronger patterning of behavior according
to donor characteristics, rather than dyadic characteristics, such as kinship or return generosity.
1.2. Current Aims and Approach
The current study explores the stationary and dynamical patterns of interaction within one social
network over a sixteen-week window with respect to kinship and reciprocity. Motivated by the theoretical
and empirical research outlined above, we ask: to what degree is there stable heterogeneity in the
intensity of dyadic social relationships (as opposed to equal mixing or generalized giving within the
sample), controlling for spatial proximity? To test predictions from the theories of kin selection and
dyadic reciprocity, we evaluate the degree to which this heterogeneity is associated with the degree of
relatedness and patterns of reciprocation across dyads. We further ask whether there is an observable
signal of direct, event-dependent reciprocation of hosting between dyads within the time scale of the
study. In order to shed light on the empirical relationship between kinship and dyadic reciprocity, we ask
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whether and how the stationary (long-term) or dynamic (short-term) signals of reciprocity differ between
related and unrelated dyads.
For the statistical evaluation of these questions, we employ a mix of quantitative methods. Multi-level
regression models are utilized to analyze the structure of stationary patterns of interaction over the sample
period. We also introduce a new method for the evaluation of conditional, non-stationary or time-specific
reciprocity effects, drawing on the formalism of probability calculus. This analysis builds on methods
for the analysis of network dynamics developed in [8,9].
2. Methods
2.1. Population and Field Setting
The Tsimane’ are an indigenous population of forager-horticulturalists living in the Beni region of
northeastern Bolivia. There are currently roughly 11,000 Tsimane’ residing in 90 villages in the forested
region between the foothills of the Andes and the wetland-savannas of the Llanos de Moxos. The
Tsimane’ practice a subsistence economy of hunting, fishing, collecting and horticulture; some families
in villages with access to the modern Bolivian market also engage in wage labor or cash crop rice.
It is typical for multiple, often closely-related, nuclear families to reside together in residential clusters,
within which food and labor are regularly shared. Individuals and families commonly cooperate in
hunting, fishing and horticultural field labor (e.g., clearing and harvesting fields). Villagers also rely on
each other for support during periods of illness, injury or loss [20,56].
Among the Tsimane’, manioc beer is made by cooking and fermenting sweet manioc (sp. Manihot
esculenta) over a period of several days. While men and women both contribute to cultivating manioc,
preparing the beer is almost exclusively the activity of women. After harvesting, the manioc is peeled,
sliced and boiled in water for several hours in large metal pots over open fire, with intermittent stirring.
The viscous mixture is then poured into wooden bins to ferment. Pieces of boiled manioc are masticated
and reintroduced to the brew, which is fermented for a period of 1–6 days. Ground maize is sometimes
added to increase alcohol content, which is likely to fall in the range of 0%–4% [10]. The home-brew
is consumed from a hollowed gourd within the household and at social gatherings and fiestas: “when
offering chicha, all those present are served from the same gourd in a rotating fashion, to refresh them
and to satiate their stomachs, until the last drop is finished” [1]. Sweeter, usually less fermented chicha
is also made from maize or bananas.
2.2. Data Collection and Preparation
Manioc beer network data were collected in 2007 in one Tsimane’ village (population198 individuals;
35 nuclear families) located on the Rı́o Maniqui, downriver from the town of San Borja, Bolivia. Over
a sample period of 16 weeks, interviews were conducted in the Tsimane’ language by P.L.H. or one of
two Tsimane’ research assistants with each family roughly twice per week. These interviews recorded
the family’s reports of preparing, drinking and serving manioc beer during the preceding two days.
For analysis of the manioc beer dataset as a network, nuclear families constitute nodes, while the
daily frequencies of hosting constitute the weight of directed edges that connect them. The sample
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of 54,218 possible directed dyadic interactions includes one observation for each day that a given
family was at risk of being observed hosting another given family (because either the potentially
hosting or hosted family completed an interview covering that day). Given an observed tendency for
under-reporting, observation days for which two families’ reports disagree on attendance were reconciled
in favor of the positive report. Eleven instances in which hosts and guests reported divergent dates for
what was likely to be the same event were randomly reconciled in favor of one of the two reports.
Kinship was estimated on the basis of genealogical data (census and demographic interviews)
collected by the Tsimane’ Health and Life History Project throughout 2006–2007 [57]. The genetic
relatedness between a given pair of families, i and j, was calculated as the mean relatedness of each
member of family i with each member of family j on the basis of ≥3 generations of genealogical data
using the kinship2 package in R [58,59]. Distances between families were calculated according to the
spherical law of cosines using household locations recorded with a handheld GPS unit. The hosting and
kinship networks were visualized using the igraph package in R, with node layouts optimized by the
Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm [60].
2.3. Multi-Level Regression
For the stationary analysis of hosting patterns between families, multi-level logistic regression models
predicting the probability that one family hosted another on a given risk day, were estimated using the
glmer function in the lme4 package in R [61,62]. These models take the form:


P (“i hosts j” at time t)
= αi + αj + αij + Xβ
(1)
ln
1 − P (“i hosts j” at time t)
Stationary heterogeneity in the patterning of interactions across families and dyads was modeled with
the inclusion of random effects, αi , αj and αij , for the identities of hosts, guests and host-guest dyads,
respectively. The use of random effects allows for the partitioning of variance between multiple levels
of aggregation within the data. The variance of the random effects in these models indicates the share of
variance unexplained by the model’s predictors (Xβ), which is attributable to higher-order groupings, in
this case, host, guest and host-guest dyad identity [63,64].
To account for differential under-reporting by guests relative to hosts, a fixed effect was included that
flagged potential dyadic events that were covered in the interviews of potential guests, but not hosts.
Changes in the frequency of hosting over time (see Figure 1) were modeled with the inclusion of fixed
effects for each week of observation. The ability of family-level characteristics of hosts and guests—the
mean age of household heads and number of family members—to explain variation in rates of hosting
and attendance was evaluated on the basis of minimization of Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC).
The ability of spatial proximity, kinship and stationary reciprocity (i.e., contingency) to explain
variation in the probability of family i hosting family j was evaluated by inclusion of predictor variables
representing: (1) the natural logarithm of distance between households (km); (2) the mean genetic
relatedness of each dyad; and (3) the mean rate that family j hosted i over the sample period. The
potential for different patterns of reciprocation depending on kinship status was evaluated with inclusion
of an interaction between relatedness and reciprocal hosting.
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Figure 1. Seasonal effects in hosting. Shown here, for the discrete sampling points, is
the probability that an observed pair is a hosting pair. A lull in late June separates two
more active periods; the May period is overall the most active, followed by the July and
August season.

We recognize that correlations between the rates that i hosts j and j hosts i may arise for a number
of reasons. For example, i may visit j and vice versa simply because i and j live in close proximity or
because i and j are closely related. Correlations due entirely to such factors would not provide strong
evidence for the kind of contingent reciprocity described in the evolutionary literature; the presence,
however, of a significant relationship controlling for “confounding” third factors, such as distance or
kinship, provides stronger support for the hypothesis that relationships are maintained in part by the logic
of reciprocity (i.e., that the generosity of i to j is encouraged by the generosity of j to i, and vice versa).
It is also worth recognizing that the use of spatial proximity as an independent control in tests of the
effects of kinship and reciprocity is conservative, in the sense that household locations are endogenous
choices, which are made, in part, with respect to the location of one’s kin and close social partners; this
is especially true among the Tsimane’, who exhibit high residential mobility and are unconstrained by
private ownership of land. Twenty-two percent of the variance in distance between families is explained
by genetic relatedness in the current dataset.
While random effects account for some aspects of the non-independence of outcomes across
observations, conventional significance tests for models of network data may be biased, due to other
aspects of non-independence in the data structure. Significance values for estimates of fixed and
random effects were therefore bootstrapped by comparing observed values against the distribution of
values produced from resampled data in which hosting outcomes (0 or 1) were randomly shuffled
across observations.
2.4. Time-Series Analysis
In addition to our analysis of stationary patterns, we also look for dynamical signatures of reciprocity.
We look for evidence, at all timescales—days to months—available in our data, for causal and
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non-stationary relationships between families mediated by hosting. To do this, we construct a general
model for pairwise interactions, which we refer to as “conditional-action” reciprocity.
Informally, conditional-action reciprocity is when family j “returns the favor” of being hosted by
family i, by themselves hosting a member of family i at a later date. Formally, we consider the ratio of
the conditional probability to the base rate:
Rij (∆t) =

P (“j hosts i” at time t + ∆t | “i hosts j” at time t)
P (“j hosts i”)

(2)

or, in other words, the fraction by which the probability of j hosting i is increased given a prior hosting
of j by i.
The definition of Equation (2) has intuitive appeal as a way to track the underlying mechanisms by
which reciprocity might develop and be maintained over time. Care, however, must be taken in systems
where patterns of pro-social behavior are connected to long-standing social expectations. Imagine, for
example, that families i and j have established a practice where, on average, each hosts the other five
times a month. Each family has a constant probability of hosting (≈1/6 per day), which is unchanged
by the occurrence of a hosting event by the other. Such a pattern would thus be invisible to the
measure above, despite the fact that it might well be part of a social practice maintained by the norms
of reciprocity.
Interruptions of the pattern established by i and j may lead to a detectable signal, as might
the (reciprocated) decision by one family to increase the frequency with which they host the other.
Such essentially non-stationary effects are necessary to lead to a detectable change in the conditional
probabilities underlying the definition in Equation (2). Conditional-action definitions of reciprocation
have the paradoxical effect that they lead to zero signal, not only in non-reciprocal populations, but also
in highly pro-social systems, where patterns of reciprocation are stable and unchanging.
In analogous cases in the non-human world, interventions are possible, in which variables are altered
by external manipulation (the “do” operation of [65]). This allows an experimenter to interrupt stable
patterns of reciprocity—by, say, preventing the commission, or undoing the omission, of a favor—to
detect an underlying conditional law. For reasons of both ethics and practicality, however, data in human
systems are often observational, as opposed to interventional, in nature. In our case, we only observe
what people have done, rather than asking them to behave differently. This makes dynamical and causal
relationships more difficult, though not in all cases impossible, to detect. In particular, it requires more
sophisticated attention to both estimation methods and to null model design, which we address further
in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1. Estimating Conditional-Action Reciprocity
The data consist of samples taken on discrete days, concerning the events of the two previous days.
Sampling was incomplete; we account for all sampling effects by means of an observation window,
oij (t). Here, oij (t) is unity if the hosting event “i hosts j at time t” was potentially observable (if either
the host or the guest were interviewed). The actual hosting events we represent by hij (t), where hij (t) is
unity if i was indeed observed to host j at time t, and zero otherwise. By definition, if hij (t) is non-zero
for a particular pair and time, so is oij (t).
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Given these definitions, any particular Rij pair can be estimated, correcting for observational
windowing effects:
! P
! P
!
P
0
0
0
t,t0 ;t0 −t=∆t oij (t)oji (t )
t,t0 ;t0 −t=∆t oij (t)oji (t )
t,t0 ;t0 −t=∆t hij (t)hji (t )
P
P
R̂ij (∆t) = P
0
0
0
t,t0 ;t0 −t=∆t oij (t)oji (t )
t,t0 ;t0 −t=∆t hij (t)oji (t )
t,t0 ;t0 −t=∆t oij (t)hji (t )
(3)
where we use the rule:
P (A, B)
(4)
P (A|B) =
P (B)
and the maximum-likelihood estimator:
P (A) =

N (A)
N

(5)

where N is the number of observations and N (A) the number of observations where event type A was
observed to obtain. As the amount of data becomes large, R̂ becomes an increasingly good estimator
of R; in particular, as:
!
X
hij hji → ∞
(6)
t,t0 ;t0 −t=∆t

then:
R̂ij → Rij

(7)

In the limit of infinite data, and arbitrarily long time-streams, a system without dynamical,
conditional-action reciprocity will measure Rij for each i-j pair at its expectation value of one. Because
the measurement of reciprocity in any particular i-j pair is expected to be extremely noisy, we consider
Rij estimates averaged over pairs drawn from sets of interest. We focus on three groups: all pairs with
observed reciprocity, all close kin pairs with observed reciprocity and all distant and non-kin pairs with
observed reciprocity. We renormalize the observed values of Rij by reference to the expectation for that
particular pair under the null model of interest, so that we report:
*
+
R̂ij (∆t)
R̂(∆t) =
(8)
hR̂ij (∆t)inull ij∈C
where averaging over realizations of a particular null model is written h. . .inull and averaging over sets of
i-j pairs is written h. . .iij∈C ; the class, C, might be “all pairs”, “close kin pairs” or “not close kin pairs”.
2.4.2. A Three-Level Hierarchy of Null Models for Conditional-Action Reciprocity
Null models are a standard tool for determining to what information an underlying mechanism needs
to have access. Use of a hierarchy of null models (with increasingly strict nulls forcing the allowed
behavior closer and closer to the observed data) allows us to gather information for or against different
kinds of underlying effective mechanisms. Previous studies of behavioral systems in non-human
primates have used null hierarchies to determine the role of pairwise vs. higher-order relationships in
conflict [8] and to determine the relative role of exogenously vs. endogenously-driven decision-making
in conflict management [9].
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Here, we use nulls to compare measurements of R̂ij to those measured on simulated datasets that
match (on average) various stationary properties of the data while selectively destroying correlations.
This allows us to determine both effect size (how much larger R̂ij is than unity, for example—a direct
measure of the level of conditional-action reciprocity in the system) and effect significance (whether
or not an effect of a particular size could have occurred by chance in a model without an underlying
condition-action mechanism). These nulls amount to large collections of simulated datasets. We measure
the same quantities (such as average R̂ij ) on this simulated data and determine whether or not we can
establish evidence for mechanisms “over and above” those allowed for by the nulls.
We consider three null models of increasing strictness. The mechanisms underlying all three nulls are
time-independent: i.e., they contain no conditional-action mechanisms. Each observation period is an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sampling from mechanisms defined by what features of
the original data they hold constant.
The first null we call the homogeneous null. In this case, we preserve, on average, each family’s
probability of hosting a party and the distribution of the sizes of the parties they do host. In particular,
we preserve:
P (“i hosts a party”)
(9)
and (by means of a sufficient statistic for the binomial distribution):
P (“i hosts a party of size N ”)

(10)

This null preserves many features of the data. Families that host many parties do so (on average) in
this null and with the same size distribution. However, the preferences that a host might have to host
one family over another are erased. In this model, parties are “pure sociability”—they reflect only an
individual family’s desire to share resources with the larger community.
The second, stricter, null is the kin-heterogeneous null. In this case, we allow hosting preferences
to vary, but require them, for each host, to be identical for all families with the same mean r. In this
model, parties are reflections of long-standing, stationary preference that particular hosts have for kin
groups. These preferences are allowed to be asymmetric, meaning that P (“i hosts j”) and P (“j hosts i”)
can differ.
The third, and most strict, null is the full-heterogeneous null. In this case, we preserve, on average,
all host-guest pairwise probabilities; in particular, the probability of observing a particular host-guest
pair, P (“i hosts j”) is preserved on average. In this model, parties are reflections of long-standing,
stationary preferences between particular host-guest pairs. As in the kin-heterogeneous null, these
preferences are allowed to be asymmetric.
These three nulls specify how to construct a set of probabilities for hosting, P (“i hosts j”), which can
then be sampled, in an i.i.d. fashion, to produce simulated data, which is then windowed by the actual
observation structure and from which the conditional-action reciprocity term, R̂ij (∆t), can be estimated.
We make, for the sake of accuracy, two minor corrections to this account—a non-stationary correction
for seasonal effects and a stationary correction for differences in how guests vs. hosts report information
to the observers; these corrections are described in detail in the Appendix, Section A.
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3. Results
We now summarize a number of characteristics of the network and report our results for kinship and
stationary and dynamical reciprocity.
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3.1. Summary Statistics
The mean daily probability of one family hosting another given family measured over the sample
period is 0.926% (502/54,218 host-guest risk days). The distributions of the frequency of hosting and
being hosted across families are given in Figure 2a,b, respectively. It is clear that while most families
attend chicha events, only some families host them frequently; as a result, the variance in the rate of
hosting is roughly five times that of the rate of being hosted.
The distribution of the weights of host-guest relationships over the sample period is given in Figure 3a.
At least one hosting event was observed for 17% (208/1190) of possible host-guest dyads. The
distribution of mean genetic relatedness between families is given in Figure 3b. For the genealogical data
available (which may omit more distant ancestry), the mean relatedness of families in this community
is 0.0293. Roughly 4% (23/595) of family dyads are related with mean r ≥ 0.25 (principally
parent-offspring and sibling dyads); 21% (124/595) are related with 0 < r < 0.25 (secondary and
more distant kin); while 75% (448/595) are unrelated.
Figure 4 plots the hosting and kinship networks with two different layouts: the layout of the first row
of networks is set according to the kinship network, while that of the second row is set according to the
hosting network. For either layout, comparison of the hosting network with the kinship network shows
that while hosting tends to occur most frequently between close kin, many hosting relationships also
occur between non-kin; there is also clear variation in the relative magnitude of relationships within both
related and unrelated interacting dyads.
3.2. Multi-Level Regression
Table 1 gives the results of the multi-level regression predicting the likelihood of host-guest
interactions across the sample period. Baseline parameter estimates with the inclusion of controls for
the week of observation and reporting bias are given in Model A. The variance of the random effects in
this baseline model quantifies the degree to which hosting is idiosyncratically distributed across hosts,
guests and host-guest relationships. Confirming the impression given in Figure 2, there is substantially
greater systematic variation in the propensity to host than in the propensity to attend (2.581 vs. 0.046).
The variance in hosting that is attributable to the identity of specific host-guest dyads (2.733) is also
significant, indicating substantial heterogeneity in the intensity of relationships between families within
the community. The reporting control confirms that events covered only by guests’ interviews were
reported at significantly lower rates than those covered by hosts’.
Model B shows the best-fit model for hosting frequency with the inclusion of family-level predictors.
The rate of hosting and attendance varies significantly with the mean age of household heads, with AIC
minimization favoring quadratic and linear fits for host and guest ages, respectively. The frequency of
hosting first increases with age, peaks around age 50 and declines thereafter; the frequency of attendance,
on the other hand, decreases weakly with age. There is also a positive association between the frequency
of hosting and family size (β = 0.224, p = 0.024), but the effect is not significant and does not yield
improvements in AIC when age terms are also included in the model. Rates of attendance are not
significantly predicted by the family size of guests (β = 0.028, p = 0.416) [66].
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Figure 4. Networks of kinship and manioc beer hosting. Panels (a) and (c) represent the
kinship network, with the edge width indicating mean genetic relatedness. Panels (b) and
(d) represent the hosting network; edge widths indicate the mean hosting frequency between
the two families, while arrows indicate the direction of attendance. The layouts of panels (a)
and (b) are optimized based on the kinship network, while those of (c) and (d) are optimized
based on the hosting network. Node color indicates mean age of household heads (ascending
in age from green to red), while node size indicates family size.
Kinship network

Hosting network
(b)

(c)

(d)

Hosting layout

Kinship layout

(a)

Models C, D, E and F assess the extent to which proximity, kinship and the stationary rate of reciprocal
hosting can account for idiosyncratic variation in the quality of host-guest relationships. Models C and
D show that on their own, household distance and kinship are each able to explain 59% (1−1.166/2.817)
and 60% (1−1.120/2.817) of the variance attributed to dyad identity in Model B, respectively. Included
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together in model E, each of these variables independently predicts hosting frequency and together
explain a total of 71% (1−0.824/2.817) of the variance attributed to dyad identity in model B.
Table 1. Multi-level logistic regression models predicting the likelihood that family i hosts
family j on a given sample day (the models include intercept and time controls, not shown).
A

B

Random effects
Host identity (αi )
Guest identity (αj )
Host-guest dyad (αij )
Predictors
Guest report only
Host age
Host age2
Guest age
Log distance
AIC

Var(α)
2.581
0.046
2.733
β
−0.972

Random effects
Host identity (αi )
Guest identity (αj )
Host-guest dyad (αij )
Predictors
Guest report only
Host age
Host age2
Guest age
Log distance
Kinship
Rate j hosts i
Kinship × Rate j hosts i
AIC

Var(α)
2.778
0.129
1.120
β
−0.965
0.229
−0.002
−0.007

eβ
0.381
1.257
0.998
0.993

p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.008

14.02

1.2E6

<0.001

eβ
0.378

p
<0.001
0.008
<0.001
p
<0.001

Var(α)
1.875
0.018
2.817
β
−0.964
0.223
−0.002
−0.009

4,565

Var(α)
3.262
0.135
1.166
β
−0.956
0.293
−0.003
−0.007
−1.050

p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.008
<0.001
<0.001

Var(α)
3.276
0.032
0.619
β
−0.959
0.276
−0.003
−0.009
−0.520
8.435
19.99
−64.86

4,560

D

4,354

eβ
0.381
1.250
0.998
0.991

C
p
<0.001
0.082
<0.001
p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

E
Var(α)
3.164
0.111
0.824
β
−0.954
0.268
−0.003
−0.007
−0.618
8.860

eβ
0.385
1.307
0.997
0.993
0.539
7045

4,294

eβ
0.384
1.340
0.997
0.993
0.350
4,365

p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.006
<0.001

F

eβ
0.383
1.318
0.997
0.991
0.595
4606
4.8E8
7E-29
4,255

p
<0.001
0.030
<0.001
p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.234

The full model including terms for distance, stationary reciprocity, kinship and their interaction is
given in Model F. This model shows that the mean rate at which family j hosts family i is a substantially
positive predictor of the likelihood of family i hosting j on any given day, controlling for both spatial
proximity and kinship. The coefficient on the reciprocity term indicates that a 0.01 increase in the daily
rate that j hosts i is associated with a 22% increase in the likelihood that i hosts j on a given sample day.
The combination of the three dyadic predictors together account for roughly 78% (1−0.619/2.817) of
the total variance attributable to dyad identity in Model B. Model F also estimates a negative interaction
between kinship and reciprocal hosting, which may suggest the following interpretation: while the
baseline level of interaction is higher among kin than non-kin, the estimated marginal effect of j
hosting i on the likelihood of i hosting j is greater for non-kin than kin. The interaction, however,
is not statistically significant when compared against resampled null models.

Entropy 2013, 15

4946

In sum, the regression results confirm the existence of stationary heterogeneity in the quality of
relationships across the sample period, which is patterned according to and well explained on the basis
of both kinship and stationary reciprocity, above and beyond the effects of spatial proximity.
3.3. Time-Series Analysis
We present our results for conditional-action reciprocity in Figure 5. These panels show the average
reciprocity, R, over all pairs in the system with hosting in both directions (i.e., R(∆t) is the average of all
Rij (∆t), such that N (“i hosts j”) and N (“j hosts i”) are non-zero and observable at some separation).
Figure 5. Average reciprocity, as a function of separation, ∆t, compared to our null
hierarchy. Blue bands indicate the one and two-sigma ranges for the three null models in
turn. (a): Homogeneous null; (b) Kin-heterogeneous null; (c): Full-heterogeneous null. See
Section 2.4.2. for further details on the formulation of these models.

(a)

(b)

(c)
Some apparent signatures of conditional-reciprocity can be seen, particularly on the very shortest
(≤3 day) scales. Evaluated against the null expectations of no heterogeneity in interaction rates between
specific host-guest pairs (Figure 5a) or of heterogeneity conditioned only on the degree of relatedness
(Figure 5b), the effect is large, with a roughly eight-fold increase in the conditional probability that
j hosts i within three days after i hosts j. Figure 5c shows the signal of time-dependent reciprocity
compared against a null allowing for idiosyncratic stationary (i.e., i.i.d. process) preferences for
interaction between host-dyad pairs. Under this stricter null, what appeared to be a large effect
reduces in size, but does not disappear entirely: the fully heterogeneous preference model estimates
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an approximately 2.4-fold increase in the conditional probability that j reciprocates within three days of
i hosting j, an effect which is significant at p ≈ 0.01, or approximately 2σ.
Figure 6. Rapid timescale (t ≤ 3 days) reciprocity values. Solid lines show the distribution
of observed data; dashed lines that for the full-heterogeneous null. (a): All pairs; (b): Closely
related (r ≥ 0.25) pairs; (c): Distant and non-kin (r < 0.25) pairs. Close kin show a far
weaker signal of reciprocity compared to distant and non-kin.

(a)

(b)

(c)
In Figure 6, we examine the evidence for short-term (≤3 day) reciprocity among three host-dyad
groupings: All (all possible hosting pairs), Close kin (all pairs with average kinship greater than or equal
to 0.25) and Not close kin (all pairs with kinship strictly less than 0.25). We plot the distributions for
each of these categories, compared to the null expectation, and compute the p-score. The positive result
for ≤3 day conditional-action reciprocity across all pairs (mean Rij = 2.4, p≈ 0.01) is clearly driven by
interactions between distant and non-kin (mean Rij = 3.0, p = 0.008) rather than close kin pairs (mean
Rij = 0.63, p ≈ 0.6; no detectable deviation from null expectation).
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The bottom panel of Figure 5 also shows a positive R value exceeding null expectations at the twosigma level at around 50 days. As there is no specific reason to expect a positive signal of time-dependent
reciprocity at this temporal distance (rather than, say, at 45 or 55 days), we consider this most likely a
fluctuation due to chance alone. Care must be taken not to hunt for signals at an arbitrary time without
either good justification or careful adjustment of p-value significance, since, in the words of [67], “look
long enough, find anything.”
3.4. Discussion
We have probed the structure of the Tsimane’ manioc beer hosting network for statistical signatures
expected from the theories of kin selection and dyadic reciprocity. With respect to kinship, the current
results are unambiguous. Kinship independently predicts rates of hosting and attendance between dyads.
In addition to the independent effect of kinship, a portion of the variance in hosting attributed to
spatial distance can also be attributed to kinship, since kinship also partially determines the location
of households.
With respect to reciprocity, the results allow some conclusions, but not others. The stationary analysis
of Section 3.2 shows that across the sample period, families clearly host others that host them in turn at a
level above and beyond that expected on the basis of kinship and spatial proximity alone. In the dynamic
analysis of Section 3.3, we searched for the signature of time-sensitive, conditional-action reciprocity
that might account for the observed rates of stationary reciprocation within the network. This analysis
revealed a significant increase in the probability that j hosts i within three days of i hosting j, above
and beyond the general (time-independent) tendency for j to host i over the sample period. The relative
size and time-frame of the detected conditional-action reciprocity effect are modest, suggesting that an
alternative model—one which allows for dyad-specific preferences for hosting and attendance, but which
has no dynamic properties—is in fact nearly sufficient to explain the observed rates of bilateral hosting.
These results obtain in the context of the four-month baseline of behavior established across the study,
a period that included significant changes in task (e.g., a shift from harvesting rice in May and June to
clearing new fields in August and September).
There are a number of reasons why strong signals of conditional-action reciprocity have remained
difficult to detect, even if reciprocity does act as an important mechanism maintaining cooperation in
this and other social systems. First, it may be that many of the relevant causal events occur outside the
confines of the current network. Chicha, for example, may be offered as a way of eliciting or rewarding
cooperative labor in horticultural work, food sharing or political support. Second, the decision rules
underlying conditional social behavior are likely to be substantially more subtle and complex, depending
on the specific context and history of interaction, than the simple time-dependent mechanism posited
here. Third, the mechanisms supporting reciprocation within long-term relationships—such as selective
partner choice and retention or emotional commitment—may occur across relatively longer time scales
than those investigated in the current study, creating the conditions for reciprocity without explicit or
perceptible score-keeping at shorter time scales [32,38].
Additionally, the threat of conditional-action reciprocity effects may remain relevant to the
construction of highly reciprocal and pro-social societies, yet prove undetectable in the absence of
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perturbation. A perfectly law-abiding society has no record of arrests, but this does not indicate that the
laws themselves do not exist. This apparent paradox—that more fully-cooperative societies would show
less evidence for dynamical reciprocity—may be accessible to empirical study. While direct-intervention
experiments are problematic due to considerations of ethics or expense, naturally occurring perturbations
could give a window onto the problem.
It may be the case, for example, that a new arrival to a highly-cooperative society must establish their
bona fides with the community by means of conditional-reciprocity effects. In particular, preferences for
the new arrival must be established by the other community members, and vice versa. In the formal
language of the present time-series analysis, a newly arrived family, i, could be expected to show
evidence for above-null R—either Ri? or R?i —as they raise their probability of hosting another family,
j, in response to signals from j that this is desired. The signal that j might send includes the hosting of
i in return, so that first P (“i hosts j”) rises as i experiments with a new relationship, then P (“j hosts i”)
rises. If the prior probability of j hosting i is small (as might be expected for the new-comer, i), this
effect would lead to an Rij much greater than unity.
It is worth recognizing that other motivations and processes are likely to underlie behavior in
the chicha hosting network beyond dyadic reciprocity and kinship-based altruism. Some degree of
generosity in this network, for instance, may be motivated by concerns for reputation management,
which supersede the specific dyad in question [49]. Generalized altruism might also be reinforced
through mechanisms of reward and punishment not captured here, as suggested by the literature on peer
monitoring and strong reciprocity [52,53]. The fact that one may fairly easily join chicha gatherings
without explicit invitation may also limit hosts’ control of attendance in ways that create a scope for
scrounging (or tolerated theft) and disrupt clear patterns of directed reciprocation [13,68]. One may
note, however, that none of these processes predicts the substantial within-community heterogeneity in
dyad-specific relationship quality, which we have observed in the current study.
The substantial variance in the rates of hosting unexplained by age or family size also begs
investigation and is consistent with the hypothesis that hosting may be motivated in part by the benefits
of signaling wealth, productivity or social status [54]. Such heterogeneity would also be consistent
with a degree of specialization and division of labor between families (with some families focusing, for
example, on production of meat, and others on the production of horticultural goods, including chicha,
as described in [20,69]).
The current results also bear on the intersection of kin selection and dyadic reciprocity. In addition
to the negative (though not significant) interaction between reciprocity and kinship in the stationary
analysis, the significant conditional-action reciprocity effect of the dynamic analysis held among distant
and non-kin, but not among close kin. These patterns suggest that kinship and reciprocity in this network
act as strategic substitutes, rather than complements, in contrast to the results of several evolutionary
models and empirical studies [23,44,47,48]. This may prompt the refinement of the theory to better
understand the social and ecological conditions under which different mechanisms supporting altruism
and cooperation may reinforce each other or crowd each other out [70].
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4. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented new results on the nature of cooperation and the maintenance of
social ties and have introduced new methods to detect signals of dynamical processes within social
networks. Using detailed information gathered from a sixteen-week ethnographic study of manioc beer
drinking events, we have looked for signatures of genetic kinship and stationary reciprocity in patterns of
directed social behavior. While spatial distance is a major predictor of the rates of hosting and attendance,
families host other families (a) that are more closely related and (b) that host them in turn significantly
more frequently than expected based on distance or family-level characteristics alone.
We have sought a potential dynamical signature for the emergence of these long-lasting stationary
ties. Using the formalism of probability calculus, we have searched for the simplest possible
signature of conditional-action reciprocity at different time-scales. We have shown how to estimate
conditional-action reciprocity and determine its statistical significance using a hierarchy of null
behavioral models. The results show a significant signal of conditional-action reciprocity at very short
(≤3 day) time scales among distantly and unrelated families, but not among close kin. Apart from this
effect, much of the variation in interaction rates is well accounted for by assuming stable preferences
for hosting between specific family pairs, which are stationary and unchanging across the time period
of observation.
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A. Appendix: Further Details on Statistical Estimation of Conditional-Action Reciprocity
A.1. Correction for Seasonality
Figure 1 shows that the overall level of hosting changes throughout the dataset. While these shifts
could in principle be caused by multiple conditional-reciprocity effects, a more parsimonious explanation
might associate them with general shifts in activity over the course of the year. A truly i.i.d. sampling
from stationary preferences would not allow for these exogenous events and would lead to the anomalous
detection of signals of conditional reciprocity.
As an example, consider the lull in party activity seen in the data in late June. This occurs between
a high-activity period in May and a medium-activity period in July and August. If these seasonal
effects were not corrected for, this large-scale pattern would lead to a detection of anomalously low
conditional reciprocity at separations of roughly thirty days. We thus, in all three nulls, allow for overall,
family-independent, shifts in the stationary probabilities in the data. We smooth these corrections on
one-week scales, which we consider sufficient to capture exogenously-driven changes in party hosting.
A.2. Correction for Reporting
There are two ways in which an observer can come to know about a party: by interviewing the host
and asking them to list the guests or by interviewing someone who turns out to have been a guest. The
two questions (“who drank at your house?” and “at whose house did you drink?”), though formally
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symmetric (if i hosted j, then j was hosted by i) may be answered differently, due to memory, shyness
or other social factors. In many cases, both host and guest have been interviewed, and differences in the
data can be reconciled.
In other cases, however, only one of the pairs is contacted at that time period, and so, we are unable
to perform reconciliation. In order to properly compare simulated data to actual data, however, we
need to simulate not only “the truth”—i.e., the actual hosting patterns—but also the reporting of that
truth. Since we do not have directly-observed evidence for party attendance and our data rely upon
participant report, we model the host reports as truth and deviations from host reports as due to additional
reporting mechanisms.
To a first approximation, we model the guest reporting mechanism with a single parameter, pomit : the
probability that a guest fails to report a party that the host reports. We emphasize that this refers not to the
forgetting of an actual event (as we do not have access to this information), but rather to the probability
that a guest omits describing an event that a host describes.
We can determine pomit by requiring that our null models reproduce, on average, the same level of
realized guest-host pairs (502) as seen in the data. We find that the correction necessary is quite high,
pomit , the probability that a guest “forgets” to mention a party that the host indicates has taken place,
to be 0.687 ± 0.001 for the full-heterogeneous case, 0.720 ± 0.002 for the kin-heterogeneous case and
0.727 ± 0.001 for the homogeneous case.
In our model, this probability is independent of both guest and guest-host. Indirect evidence that
this is only an approximation to the true underlying dynamics is given by the slight differences, over
and above statistical error, in pomit within the null hierarchy, which should coincide if (1) the reporting
mechanisms are independent of the party-attending mechanisms and (2) all relevant features of the
reporting mechanisms are captured.
An additional effect is the possibility of non-random sampling: in particular, a correlation between
i hosting j, j hosting i, i being observed and j being observed. Simulations suggest that this effect,
if it exists, is below the level of noise due to small-number fluctuations. In particular, it is not possible to
reject the hypothesis that “correlations do not exist” by reference to the stationary probabilities observed
in the data versus those measured in the nulls.
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